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I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of global climate disruption requires a rather specific
solution, the phase-out of fossil fuels. 1 Most policy experts and
policymakers are understandably reluctant to face up to the need for such an
ambitious change.2 So, we tend to talk about climate policy in the traditional
language of environmental law, discussing the need for emission reductions.
* University Professor, Syracuse University. J.D. Yale Law School. The author
would like to thank Nicholas Cortese and Joseph Frateschi for research assistance.
1.
See Myles Allen et al., Commentary, The Exit Strategy, NATURE REP.
CLIMATE CHANGE, May 2009, at 56, 58, http://www.nature.com/climate/2009/0905/pdf/
climate.2009.38.pdf (calling for phasing out net carbon dioxide emissions altogether and
leaving substantial fossil fuel resources in the ground); James Hansen et al., Target
Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 228
(2008),
http://www.benthamscience.com/open/toascj/articles/V002/217TOASCJ.pdf
(concluding that “remaining fossil fuel reserves should not be exploited without a plan for
retrieval and disposal of resulting atmospheric CO2”); Veerabhadran Ramanathan &
Yangyang Xu, The Copenhagen Accord for Limiting Global Warming: Criteria, Constraints,
and Available Avenues, 107 PNAS 8055, 8057 (2010) (including the replacement of fossil
fuels with renewables as things we must do in order to halve emissions by 2050 while calling
for eighty percent reductions by 2100); Henry Shue, Climate Hope: Implementing the Exit
Strategy, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 388–89 (2013) (pointing out that many of the studies cited
above may understate the need for aggressive action because they focus only on carbon
dioxide, ignoring other greenhouse gases); Michael Le Page, IPCC Digested: Just Leave the
Fossil Fuels Underground, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/
article/dn24299-ipcc-digested-just-leave-the-fossil-fuels-underground.html (interpreting the
latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change draft as a call to leave recoverable fossil
fuels in the ground); Alex Morales, Fossil Fuels Need to Stay Unburned to Meet Climate
Target, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0927/fossil-fuels-need-to-stay-unburned-to-meet-climate-target.html.
2.
See Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 1, at 8055–56; Le Page, supra note 1.
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But ultimately, routine emission reductions will not suffice; we need the
virtual elimination of emissions and that requires the phase-out of fossil
fuels.3
This may seem like a radical claim, but we certainly will phase out
fossil fuels. Because they are finite resources, they will run out eventually.4
The question for policymakers then is not whether to phase out fossil fuels; it
is whether to do so in time to avoid many of global climate disruption’s
impacts in a planned way, or whether to wait until after carbon dioxide
emissions throw the climate radically off kilter and our limited fossil fuel
resources become fiendishly expensive, perhaps suddenly, and then run out
altogether. A planned and reasonably rapid fossil fuel phase-out minimizes
economic and environmental disruption.5
Facing up to this need would hardly answer all the questions we
might ask about appropriate climate disruption policy. But it might change
the questions we consider worth asking in productive ways.
This paper will begin by making the case for a goal of phasing out of
fossil fuels. It will then discuss the questions that adopting a phase-out goal
raise about both politics and policy.
II.

ON THE NEED TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS

We need to phase out fossil fuels for four major reasons. First, the
predicted and possible consequences of climate disruption are too serious for
us to risk continued emissions of fossil fuels until they run out.6 Second,
carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels account for some eighty
percent of greenhouse gas emissions both in the United States and globally.7
Third, carbon dioxide—once emitted—remains in the atmosphere for
3.
WORKING GRP. I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 26 (2013) (noting that “a large fraction
of . . . climate [disruption] . . . is irreversible,” and that even with cessation of emissions
“temperature[] will remain . . . constant at elevated levels”).
4.
See Allen et al., supra note 1, at 57–58; Hansen et al., supra note 1, at
228.
5.
Allen et al., supra note 1, at 57.
6.
See WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 11–13 (2007)
[hereinafter WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007] (discussing impacts in detail);
WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 5, 77 (2001) [hereinafter WORKING GRP. II,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001].
7.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS: 1990–2011 ES-9 (2013).
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centuries, so that emissions have a cumulative effect.8 This means that every
year in which we burn any fossil fuels we will add to climate disruption,
even if we have reduced emissions by a large amount.9 Fourth, fossil fuels
cause an enormous amount of destruction wholly apart from climate
disruption.10
Serious scientists do not doubt that greenhouse gas emissions have
disrupted the climate and will wreak greater havoc still in the future absent
drastic changes. 11 The average mean surface temperature has risen in
response to rising greenhouse gas emissions. 12 We have a rather good
understanding of the sorts of disruption rising temperatures create.13 This
conference devoted a lot of attention to one of the most basic consequences
of all—sea level rise—which has dire implications for Florida. 14 Other
consequences we can expect include more violent weather events, increasing
drought, the spread of infectious diseases, the loss of many endangered
species, and the destruction of ecosystems. 15 As with sea level rise, our
understanding of the magnitude and timing of these consequences is quite
limited.16 We have generally underestimated the extent of global warming in
the past and some ice masses have melted much more quickly than

8.
See WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 26 (pointing out that carbon dioxide
emissions generate climate change that is mostly “irreversible on a multi-century to millennial
time scale”).
9.
See id.; Allen et al., supra note 1, at 58.
10.
See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The
Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 35–
37 (2002) [hereinafter Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality] (describing harms
associated with fossil fuel burning).
11.
See WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 2–17 (discussing warming trends,
their attribution to greenhouse gas emissions, and likelihood of further warming).
12.
See id. at 2, 11–13, 15.
13.
See id. at 17–27.
14.
See WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 6, at 5
(discussing flooding from sea level rise).
15.
WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 12, 792
(discussing “increased deaths, disease and injury due to heatwaves [sic], floods, storms, fires,
and droughts” and expressing high confidence about loss of endangered species and
ecosystem destruction); WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 6, at 5, 42–43
(discussing increased incidence of diseases such as malaria, cholera, dengue, and heat stroke
mortality).
16.
See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, CLIMATE
ECONOMICS: THE STATE OF THE ART 11–15 (2013) (discussing uncertainties about sea level
rise and other key variables).
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expected.17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports generally
admonish readers to expect surprises, some of which may prove unpleasant.18
The climate system includes feedback loops that have the potential to greatly
accelerate climate disruption.19 For example, a lot of methane lies trapped
below permafrost in Siberia and elsewhere. 20 As the earth warms, it has
melted some of this permafrost, allowing some of the methane trapped
beneath to escape.21 Methane itself is a very potent greenhouse gas, so the
released methane increases warming, which can melt yet more permafrost
and lead to the release of more methane.22 In other words, runaway global
warming is a possibility, where consequences of our previous actions set up a
cycle of warming that we cannot prevent through emission reductions.23 The
possibility of calamitous warming exceeding the amount predicted by most
models cannot be ruled out, partially because of these sorts of feedback
loops.24 We do not know where a tipping point lies, which once crossed,
could have very dire consequences.25 Because of the serious consequences
predicted and the scary nature of what could happen but cannot be predicted,
we need to do everything we can to avoid future temperature increases.

17.
See id. at 12 (explaining that temperature increases have followed the
most pessimistic projections and that sea level rise has outstripped the main projections
altogether).
18.
WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 497 (stating
that “surprises should be anticipated” and are of great concern); WORKING GRP. II,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ANALYSES 5
(1996) (characterizing surprises as likely).
19.
ACKERMAN & STANTON, CLIMATE ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 15–18
(describing various feedbacks).
20.
See id. at 17–18 (describing methane in the boreal region and elsewhere).
21.
Arctic Melt “Bubbling Out” Ancient Methane, ASIAN NEWS INT’L, May
21, 2012 (stating, “[s]cientists have [discovered] thousands of sites in the Arctic where
[trapped] methane . . . is seeping out” from melting permafrost); Steve Connor, Vast Methane
‘Plumes’ Seen in Arctic Ocean as Sea Ice Retreats, INDEP. (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://independent.co.uk/news/science/vast-methane-plumes-seen-in-arctic-ocean-as-sea-iceretreats-6276278.html (describing scientists’ shock after witnessing plumes of methane being
released from permafrost and the Arctic seabed).
22.
See ACKERMAN & STANTON, CLIMATE ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 17–
18 (discussing the warming from released methane).
23.
See WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 249
(characterizing feedbacks from permafrost melting as key uncertainties in need of further
research).
24.
See Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping
Points in the Climate System, 106 PNAS 5041, 5041 (2009).
25.
See id. (discussing tipping points and our inability to accurately gauge the
probability of triggering them).
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Because roughly eighty percent of the United States greenhouse gas
emissions come from burning fossil fuels, any serious effort to address
climate disruption must have the project of addressing fossil fuel burning as
its centerpiece. 26 This does not mean that addressing fossil fuel use
constitutes the only thing we need to do to address global climate disruption,
but it does mean that successfully addressing fossil fuel use must take center
stage. That is why this symposium, like other serious efforts to address
climate disruption, focuses so heavily on energy policy questions.27
Even if we reduce emissions, we will make climate disruption worse
every year in which we continue to burn any fossil fuel at all.28 Carbon
dioxide, once emitted, remains in the atmosphere for many centuries. 29
Given the nature of the consequences and the possibility of triggering
runaway warming, we just cannot continue to increase the global store of
atmospheric carbon year after year until fossil fuels run out. Continued
emissions commit us to future disruption of unknown magnitude.30 If we
find out later that we have crossed some sort of threshold or triggered routine
consequences that we cannot easily live with, such as a level of sea level rise
that inundates Miami, we cannot reverse these consequences by subsequently
reducing emissions.31 This means, as Howard A. Latin has emphasized, that
reducing emissions by ten percent—for example—increases warming above
current levels.32 For a ten percent reduction implies that we continue to add

26.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011 ES-9 (2013) (showing that carbon dioxide made up
seventy-nine percent of United States greenhouse gas emissions in 2011); cf.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 36 fig.2.1 (2008) (indicating that fossil fuels account for 56.6% of global greenhouse
gas emissions).
27.
See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the
Models Tell Us?, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 860, 860 (2013).
28.
See Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at
35.
29.
See Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 1, at 8056 (pointing out that the
residence time for carbon dioxide is up to one thousand years).
30.
See Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at
35–36.
31.
WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that even after complete
cessation of emissions, elevated temperatures will remain constant for centuries).
32.
HOWARD A. LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES: WHY
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED 20–21 (2012) (pointing out that a
ten percent cut in emissions implies continued additions to greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere).
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ninety percent of current emissions to the global store of carbon every year,
thus adding to the current imbalance in the global carbon cycle.33
Reducing carbon dioxide emissions to zero or near zero levels
requires a fossil fuel phase-out.34 Because of the cumulative nature of the
emissions, the importance of carbon dioxide to the overall problem, and the
seriousness of the potential consequences of increasing climate disruption,
we must phase out fossil fuels long before they run out. The sooner the
fossil fuels are phased out, the smaller the likelihood of triggering runaway
warming or suffering some of the more serious consequences associated with
warming generally.35
Although I have discussed a phase-out as the right response to global
climate disruption, a goal of phasing out fossil fuels has broader merit.
Burning fossil fuels contributes greatly to severe local and regional air
pollution problems that kill tens of thousands of people annually in the
United States and even more in developing countries.36 Phasing out fossil
fuels promises relief from serious conventional air pollution, coal mining’s
destruction of land and maiming or killing of miners, an end to oil spills, and
much more. 37 The harms avoided when we phase out fossil fuels go far
beyond limiting climate disruption.
III.

HOW TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS

Phasing out fossil fuels would require a number of changes.38 The
most obvious reform needed involves greatly increased energy efficiency.39
33.
Id. at 21 (equating a ten percent cut in emissions with the addition of
ninety percent of baseline emissions to the atmosphere).
34.
Shue, supra note 1, at 386, 394.
35.
See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING
STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/globalwarmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719 (explaining that avoiding an increase in mean
surface temperature of two degrees Celsius, which scientists consider dangerous, would
require leaving eighty percent of current proven industry owned fossil fuel reserves in the
ground).
36.
Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at 28,
35 (pointing out that health studies link particulate pollution to tens of thousands of annual
deaths); e.g., Edward Wong, Early Deaths Linked to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million
in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at A9.
37.
See, e.g., Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note
10, at 51–52.
38.
Id. at 25.
39.
See John C. Dernbach et al., Energy Efficiency and Conservation: New
Legal Tools and Opportunities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2011, at 7, 7
(characterizing energy efficiency as low-hanging fruit).
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Increases in energy efficiency reduce the scope of the project of replacing
fossil fuel as the basis for our economy.40 Happily, many energy efficiency
improvements pay for themselves through savings in electricity costs. 41
They also produce jobs for contractors and engineers.42 So, they produce
win-win situations that prove attractive to rational policymakers.
Fuel switching to achieve zero emissions, even for a greatly reduced
energy requirement, however, poses significant challenges. 43 In 2012,
renewable energy and nuclear power accounted for less than twenty percent
of United States energy consumption. 44 About eighty percent came from
fossil fuels.45 At current levels of total energy consumption, we must replace
almost eighty quads of fossil fuel energy in order to reach zero emissions.46
Even a fifty percent energy efficiency improvement—an ambitious level—
would leave us with the need to replace almost forty quads of energy, a
significant amount. 47 If a phase-out is possible, it would likely require
ambitious policy measures, and might produce significant costs.
Thoroughly analyzing the question of whether a complete phase-out
is possible would require an article of its own. I will note that a recently
published analysis suggests that my home state, New York, could replace all
of its fossil fuel with renewable energy.48 It does not necessarily follow that
all areas in the country could rely solely on renewables, as renewables’
potential varies geographically. 49 The optimistic picture for New York
depends heavily on offshore wind possibilities that take advantage of New
York’s proximity to Long Island Sound and some of the Great Lakes.50 But
if a nationwide shift to one hundred percent renewables is not possible, then
phasing out fossil fuels might require some use of nuclear power.

40.
See id.
41.
Id. (discussing studies finding substantial opportunities to save money
through energy efficiency improvements are available).
42.
See id. (finding that energy efficiency improvements generate jobs).
43.
See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Examining the Feasibility of Converting New
York State’s All-Purpose Energy Infrastructure to One Using Wind, Water, and Sunlight, 57
ENERGY POL’Y 585, 586–87 (2013).
44.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 3 tbl.1.1
(2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351401.pdf.
45.
Id.
46.
See id. (showing 77.994 quads of fossil fuel related energy consumption in
2012).
47.
See id.
48.
Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 598.
49.
See id. at 598–99.
50.
See id. at 589 tbl.2 (showing that the study relies on off-shore wind for
forty percent of its power in 2030).
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The history of serious efforts to make major changes should make us
somewhat optimistic about a phase-out’s prospects. When we moved toward
phasing out ozone depleting substances, we discovered that more substitutes
existed at lower costs than academic researchers or experts at individual
companies had believed.51 Although a fossil fuel phase-out appears to pose
much greater challenges than the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals,
aggressive policies have already produced surprising results and probably
will produce more of them.52 The ozone depletion experience teaches us that
we should be wary of claims that we know how rapidly we can phase out
fossil fuels and how much it will cost. For many years prior to the initiation
of the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals, it appeared that substitutes
would either be impossible or costly.53 This proved not to be the case.54 I
am not saying that we can confidently predict that phasing out fossil fuels
will prove cheap. But we must recognize that academic studies lack
information individual companies may possess on technological possibilities,
that individual companies may have incentives not to share information they
have, and that new research can uncover possibilities that nobody knew
about. 55 Strong policies have generally done well at encouraging
innovation.56
IV.

SOME TECHNOCRATIC QUESTIONS

Even if we agree that we should phase out fossil fuels, important
questions remain about how quickly we should do so and what policy

51.
See EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND
STRATEGY 9 (2003) (stating that “it was widely believed that significant cuts in ozonedepleting chemicals would be extremely difficult and costly,” but that agreement to a fifty
percent cut created collaborations that led to subsequent identification and development of
alternatives).
52.
See, e.g., Daniel T. Kaffine et al., Emissions Savings from Wind Power
Generation in Texas, ENERGY J., 2013, at 155, 156 (discussing technological advances and
falling prices of wind energy).
53.
PARSON, supra note 51, at 8–9 (pointing out that ten years of deadlock
preceded the Montreal Protocol and that during that period many believed that cuts would be
costly and difficult).
54.
See id. at 9.
55.
See, e.g., id. (arguing that prior to regime formation, knowledge about
substitutes for ozone depleters was controlled by firms, not academics, and not shared).
56.
See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?,
33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10094, 10103–04, 10106 (2003) [hereinafter Driesen, Does Emissions
Trading Encourage Innovation?] (reviewing empirical evidence of innovation and finding it
correlated with stringent standards).
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mechanisms we should use to accomplish this. I address both of these issues
in turn.
A.

The Speed of a Phase-Out

The argument above suggests that we should phase out fossil fuels as
quickly as feasible.57 But what does that mean for policy? How should a
policymaker determine how quickly we should phase out fossil fuels?
One might think of this rapidity question as a question about the
technical feasibility of replacing fossil fuels. Although engineers studying
these sorts of questions no doubt make a contribution to resolving fossil fuel
policy questions, there are reasons to doubt that these questions are the most
central ones for policymakers.58 No society in the world has done all that is
technically feasible to phase out fossil fuels.59 Furthermore, what I already
said about the limits of any one actor’s information gathering capacity and
our ability to predict advances implies that experts can easily underestimate
our society’s technical capabilities.
One might think that a decision to phase out fossil fuels does away
with the need to consider costs. My justification for the phase-out
commitment suggests a rejection of the reigning economic orthodoxy on how
to consider costs—the theory that we should do so by setting emission
reduction targets or prices designed to equalize costs and benefits at the
margin. We should not do so for at least two reasons. First, we cannot
quantify the costs and benefits of any given mitigation measure with a
reasonable degree of precision, so cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) does not
provide a useful guide to policy.60 Second, a cost-benefit criterion in the

57.
See Brigitte Knopf et al., Managing the Low-Carbon Transition—From
Model Results to Policies, ENERGY J., 2010, at 223, 225 (arguing that the needed steep
decreases in carbon intensity require rapid energy system changes).
58.
See id. at 226; McKibben, supra note 35.
59.
See Knopf et al., supra note 57, at 226; McKibben, supra note 35.
60.
See Donald A. Brown, Climate Change, in STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 273, 306–07 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (discussing problems in
monetizing climate disruption impacts); Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, Climate
Risks and Carbon Prices: Revising the Social Cost of Carbon, ECON. E.-J., Apr. 4, 2012, at 1,
2, http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-10 (explaining that plausible
assumptions about climate sensitivity can generate estimates of carbon’s social costs at nine
hundred dollars a ton, but that many estimates have come up with much lower numbers);
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1577, 1596–97 (2011); Pindyck, supra note 27, at 861
(finding integrated assessment models at the base of climate disruption CBA close to useless
as policy analysis tools); Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in Environmental
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climate context proves even more morally obtuse for United States climate
policy than in other contexts because decisions we make about climate
disruption influence the amount of death, injury, and destruction faced not
only in Florida, but also in Bangladesh, Sub-Saharan Africa, and in Island
States.61 It is not morally acceptable to say that we will not prevent deaths in
developing countries that we—together with other developed countries—
have caused, because the prevention would cost too much.62 Nevertheless,
cost constraints remain relevant to the question of how rapidly we can
feasibly phase out fossil fuels.
A commitment to phasing out fossil fuels, however, changes the
questions we should ask about costs. We should focus primarily on cost
distribution, rather than magnitude. We should ask, for example, whether
phasing out fossil fuels at a given rate would cause unacceptable hardships
for energy consumers. For example, we must go slowly enough so that we
do not leave people with bills so high that they cannot afford electricity, heat,
and transportation. This leaves the question of how rapidly to phase out
fossil fuels somewhat dependent on other policies. We can, for example,
proceed more rapidly if we have good mass transit and robust programs to
pay electricity bills for poor people in place.63 Of course, that means that we
also have to answer questions about how much we want to spend to enhance
these sorts of programs. Furthermore, an emphasis on distribution suggests
that even for relatively cheap changes we must consider the plight of workers
losing their jobs as fossil fuel facilities shut down. It may be true that
phasing out fossil fuels will create more jobs than it takes away. 64 In a
reasonably robust economy, it may be appropriate to expect flexible labor
markets to handle the necessary transitions reasonably well. If we need to
accelerate fossil fuel phase-outs during periods of high unemployment,
however, it may be important to have job training and other kinds of
transition assistance in place to help those losing jobs in the fossil fuel
industry. 65 Congress did this with respect to the acid rain program by
and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 318–19 (2010) (explaining that
models illuminate dynamics and uncertainties rather than generate answers).
61.
See Masur & Posner, supra note 60, at 1563.
62.
See Brown, supra note 60, at 304–06 (arguing that CBA is dubious
because even high costs do not free us of our responsibilities to prevent harms to others).
63.
See Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7; Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at
595–96; Shue, supra note 1, at 384–86.
64.
Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 594–95; see also Dernbach et al., supra
note 39, at 7.
65.
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 1101,
104 Stat. 2399, 2710–11 (1990), repealed by Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105–220, § 199, 122 Stat. 936 (1998); cf. Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 594–95.
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granting the industry flexibility in how to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions;
Congress allowed the use of low sulfur coal, which would displace coalmining jobs in high sulfur coal regions.66 Accordingly, it did provide some
transitional assistance. 67 Even though we should provide transitional
assistance if we transform the economy during tough times, we should not
accept using unfounded allegations of hardship to justify slowing progress.
B.

Policy Mechanisms

Policymakers must also ask themselves about what policies can most
readily phase out fossil fuels. There seems to be a political consensus around
the globe that we should “put a price on carbon” through environmental
benefit trading or carbon taxes. 68 Yet, if one looks around the world at
advanced countries that have gone far down the road toward phasing out
fossil fuels, these two policies do not always figure as causal factors. 69
Germany now produces twenty-five percent of its energy from renewable
resources.70 Its policies have produced big declines in the price of solar and
other renewable energy sources. 71 As Michael Mehling has made clear,
Germany has achieved this progress primarily through an aggressive feed-in
tariff, which offers renewable energy producers a high price for renewable
energy.72 This policy does not directly put a price on carbon; it aims instead
66.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPACTS OF THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM ON
COAL INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT i–ii, app. at A2A3 (2001).
67.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 1101 (allocating up to
$250,000,000 for retraining and assisting miners adversely affected by employers’ Clean Air
Act compliance).
68.
See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN DESIGNING A GLOBAL
AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL WARMING 3 (2009), available at http:/ /www.econ.yale.edu/
~nordhaus/homepage/documents/Copenhagen_052909.pdf (describing the lesson that all
people must “face a market price for the use of carbon” as the economists’ “bottom line for
policy”).
69.
See Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the
European Union: The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE
ENERGY 1, 8–9 (2006).
70.
Chris Cottrell, German Renewables Output Hits Record High in H1,
REUTERS (July 26, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/germanyrenewables-idUSL6E8IQIA720120726.
71.
Craig A. Hart & Dominic Marcellino, Subsidies or Free Markets to
Promote Renewables?, 3 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 196, 203 (2012).
72.
Ralph Buehler et al., How Germany Became Europe’s Green Leader: A
Look at Four Decades of Sustainable Policymaking, SOLUTIONS, Oct. 2011, at 51, 57–58; see
Samantha Booth, Community Solar: Reviving California’s Commitment to a Bright Energy
Future, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10585, 10590–91 (2013) (noting that Germany has become the first
country to exceed thirty gigawatts of solar capacity because of its feed-in tariff); Ringel, supra
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to provide an incentive to substitute renewable energy for fossil fuels. 73
France currently relies on fossil fuels for less than ten percent of its energy.74
This extraordinary achievement stems from a government decision to build
nuclear power plants with rigid state control of both design and worker
training in order to ensure safety.75 France did not put a price on carbon;
instead, it mandated construction of zero emission facilities.76 This record
should invite some fairly simple questions: Can putting a price on carbon be
an effective strategy for phasing out fossil fuels? If so, what sorts of design
features are needed to make this approach more effective than in the past?
Are there better tools than taxes and trading for phasing out fossil fuels?
What are the advantages and limits of pricing carbon as a strategy?
I do not propose to answer all of these questions here, but I will say
something about possible answers. First of all, pricing policies must be
much more ambitious than the pricing policies countries have employed so
far if they are to have any chance in succeeding in rapidly phasing out fossil
fuels.77 Countries have generally set caps for trading programs and carbon
taxes without any clear intention to phase out fossil fuels. 78 Indeed, in
Europe, which has the most experience with these programs, the primary
goal of many of these policies is to reduce emissions rather modestly in the
near term.79 Howard Latin has questioned this sort of back-loaded strategy
that saves ambitious reductions for much later.80 He has raised concerns that
such strategies encourage investments in technologies, such as natural gas,
that we must ultimately abandon to get to zero emissions and that those who
make these investments will resist scuttling the infrastructure they have

note 69, at 6 (explaining that a feed-in tariff pays renewable energy providers an above market
price for the power they produce).
73.
Ringel, supra note 69, at 6.
74.
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION, NUCLEAR
ENERGY DATA 43 (2013) (showing that France gets only 9.8% from fossil fuels).
75.
See id. (showing that France gets seventy-five percent of its power
production from nuclear energy); Dieter Helm, Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Energy
Policy, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 247, 249 (Dieter Helm &
Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (discussing France’s ownership of the entire technology chain
for nuclear energy and state training of the nuclear workforce).
76.
See Helm, supra note 75, at 249.
77.
See, e.g., Ringel, supra note 69, at 6.
78.
See LATIN, supra note 32, at 151.
79.
Hart & Marcellino, supra note 71, at 197.
80.
See id. at 152–53, 158 (noting that “conversion from coal to natural gas”
is an interim investment that might make eventual achievement of zero emissions more
difficult).
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invested in when the time comes. 81 He would rather see us move more
directly to zero emissions.82 Adopting a goal of phasing out fossil fuels, not
simply reducing emissions, does suggest that the goals for these programs
have not been commensurate with the climate disruption problem.83
Amy Sinden and I have suggested elsewhere that a goal of phasing
out fossil fuels suggests a redesign of environmental benefit trading
programs. 84 Current approaches focus on the end-of-the-pipe and are
designed to reduce emissions.85 We argued for explicitly using trading to
phase out fossil fuels.86 This implies that allowances would limit the amount
of fossil fuels being used in the economy.87 We refer to trading—and nontrading—programs that limit dirty inputs rather than pollution outputs as
Dirty Input Limits (“DILs”).88 We have used DILs in both tradable and nontradable forms before when we phased out ozone-depleting chemicals and
lead. 89 This may seem like a radical idea, but proposed federal
comprehensive climate disruption legislation included DILs for
transportation fuels.90 We simply suggested extending this approach.91
But a bigger question we must ask is whether pricing policies—
which are conceived of as encouraging the most cost effective adjustments in
the status quo—are really the best way of transforming an economy, even if
they were ambitious. The French and German experiences suggest that some
sort of more active state role might be necessary to encourage investments
that are effective, and perhaps even cost effective in the long run, but not
81.
See id. at 158 (arguing that investments in interim technologies like
natural gas will build constituencies for those technologies that will make their abandonment
difficult); see also Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 587 (doubting that natural gas may
produce more global warming than coal because of methane emissions associated with gas
extraction and lower sulfur dioxide emissions, which mask warming).
82.
See LATIN, supra note 32, at 151.
83.
See id.
84.
See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty
Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 66–67, 104–09 (2009) (discussing a trading
program limiting consumption of fossil fuel through tradable permits limiting fossil fuel
production).
85.
See id. at 67–68 (stating that we have traditionally focused vehicle
regulation on the exhaust output).
86.
See id. at 104–09.
87.
See id.
88.
See id. at 67 (defining Dirty Input Limits (“DILs”)).
89.
See Driesen & Sinden, supra note 84, at 83–88 (discussing the lead and
ozone-depleting chemical examples).
90.
See id. at 81–83 (discussing the use of DILs in global warming bills
considered in Congress).
91.
See id. at 67.
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cost effective in the short run.92 We need more thinking about what lessons
the most successful approaches have to teach the rest of us, instead of blithe
assumptions that since pricing carbon has good efficiency properties, it must
be the right solution to the climate disruption problem. Indeed, it seems
fairly clear that price alone will not accomplish all that is needed.93 Mass
transit improvements, for example, require public expenditures—although
one can imagine using a carbon tax or auctioned permits to fund this.94
We also must recognize that an enormous project like phasing out
fossil fuels may require a level of innovation that challenges conventional
approaches, like traditional regulation, environmental taxation, and
emissions trading. 95 All of these programs require governments to make
difficult decisions about goals, in the form of choosing a cap for a trading
program or a tax rate for a carbon tax. 96 Political difficulties and the
government’s inability to predict innovation rates will tend to constrain the
ambition of these goal-setting decisions. 97 This raises the question of
whether we can invent new approaches that will do better.
I have suggested the possibility of an environmental competition
statute.98 Such a statute would allow any polluter who is reducing carbon
emissions to collect the cost of making its reductions from any competitor
with higher emissions, plus a statutory profit margin.99 In all likelihood this
would spur a race to phase out fossil fuels, since getting to zero emissions
generally secures payments, whereas continuing to pollute risks having to
pay cleaner competitors.100 This approach seeks to emulate the innovation
stimulating properties of a very competitive market, where making a superior
product allows an innovator to steal market share from its competitors,

92.
See, e.g., MIKAEL SKOU ANDERSEN, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES:
MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY 117 (1994), and Buehler et al., supra note 72, at 57.
93.
See Buehler et al., supra note 72, at 52, 57.
94.
See Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7.
95.
See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, 2 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 199, 201–05 (2010) [hereinafter Driesen, An Environmental
Competition Statute].
96.
Id. at 203–04.
97.
Id. at 203.
98.
Id. at 200–01 (describing and advocating this mechanism).
99.
Id. at 206–07 (describing the basic mechanism of an environmental
competition statute).
100.
See Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, supra note 95, at
200–01 (characterizing an environmental competition statute as “encourag[ing] contests to
improve environmental quality”).
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thereby potentially making the innovator wealthier at the expense of less
nimble competition.101
Howard Latin has proposed using carbon taxes to fund an expert
commission to fund research into zero emissions technologies and to
subsidize their deployment.102 His approach mirrors my own in following
the principle that using negative economic incentives to fund positive
economic incentives provides a powerful driver for innovation.103
These comments focus on the most challenging aspect of the phaseout problem—the problem of fuel switching. The question of how best to
minimize the use of fuel altogether—the energy efficiency problem—also
raises questions about effective policies. Policymakers around the world
have adopted a lot of successful approaches, from improved mass transit to
least cost planning for electric utilities, to regulations mandating increased
energy efficiency in appliances. 104 They have done so because of strong
evidence that people often do not adopt energy efficiency measures on their
own, even when doing so would save them money.105 The data suggest that
pricing policies without redistribution of the revenue may have limits in
encouraging the cheapest options for limiting the use of fossil fuels. On the
other hand, pricing policies that help fund energy efficiency improvements
can pair economic benefits with fuel switching, thus lessening—and perhaps
eliminating—the pain associated with rapid change.106

101.
Id. at 207 (developing the analogy between this statutory mechanism and
the “economic dynamics of [a] competitive market[]”).
102.
LATIN, supra note 32, at 162–63 (describing this scheme along with other
less central remedies).
103.
ANDERSEN, supra note 92, at 18–19, 26–27 (promoting taxes like the
French effluent tax which raise funding for environmental programs).
104.
See Veronika Czakó, Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Action at
the City Level: The Hungarian Experience, in OPPORTUNITIES AND DRIVERS ON THE WAY TO A
LOW CARBON SOCIETY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUMMER ACADEMY ‘ENERGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT’ 95, 99–101 (2013) (discussing subsidies funding energy efficiency
improvements in Hungarian apartment buildings); Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7
(describing various approaches used in the United States).
105.
See Cameron Hepburn & Nicholas Stern, The Global Deal on Climate
Change, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 36, 49 (Dieter Helm &
Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (stating that because of energy efficiency investment’s
insensitivity to price, carbon pricing will do little to increase deployment of energy
efficiency); cf. Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Capand-Trade System, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 197, 198 (Dieter
Helm & Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (stating flatly that polluters will undertake all
reductions that are less costly than the allowance price in “[a] well-designed cap-and-trade
system”).
106.
See id.
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SOME POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The major reason that the United States has not become a leader in
moving toward a phase-out of fossil fuels has been political.107 The United
States has been unwilling to even take the relatively modest step of
implementing a nationwide so-called cap-and-trade program to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.108 Nor has the United States eliminated massive
subsidies for fossil fuels, in spite of repeated proposals from the Obama
Administration to do so.109
So, a major question that the need to phase out fossil fuels raises is a
political one: What sorts of strategies would help change the political
climate over time to one that might accept measures that would phase out
fossil fuels? My own view is that we are unlikely to gain acceptance of a
program phasing out fossil fuels without environmental leaders making such
a phase-out an explicit political goal. The evidence suggests that the Obama
Administration and many environmental groups disagree with me on that.
They either do not see the need for a phase-out, or assume that it can best be
accomplished by selling steps in that direction indirectly, justifying
individual regulations as cost effective and helping with the problem of
climate disruption. 110 Thus, the Obama Administration has passed very
strong standards improving vehicle emissions and promises significant
regulation of power plants, but supports an “all-of-the-above” energy
strategy.111
I have my doubts about whether the American public can be brought
around to support a phase-out of fossil fuels without a rhetorical strategy that
prepares them to accept much more significant changes than are currently
politically feasible. If nobody tells the American public that fossil fuels are
finite resources, that an increase in their price is inevitable as they become
scarce, that renewable energy has fallen in price in countries with good
policies and will likely fall further if supported appropriately, that new
107.
See Neela Banerjee, Warning on Greenhouse Gases; A Study Says
Emissions Are on Track to Raise Global Temperatures by up to 9.54 Degrees by Century’s
End, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A11.
108.
See Stavins, supra note 105, at 198; Banerjee, supra note 108.
109.
See Banerjee, supra note 107 (stating “Congress has shown no interest in
ending fossil fuel subsidies”); Gary Gentile et al., Obama Seeks to Slash Oil Industry Tax
Breaks, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 15, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 5108712
(stating that, as of 2011, President Obama proposed eliminating fossil fuel subsidies three
times).
110.
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Limits Set on Pollution from Autos, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2010, at B1.
111.
See McKibben, supra note 35.
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industries can generate new jobs, that climate disruption will wreak havoc
unless we take ambitious measures, and that phasing out fossil fuels would
save thousands of lives and spare us all from many types of environmental
destructions wholly apart from climate disruption, I do not see how we can
ever phase out fossil fuels.
The political challenge, however, goes beyond how we debate
environmental policy. We live in an era in which many politicians oppose
any governmental role in solving most societal problems. Although we
surely need limits on governmental power, climate disruption poses
problems of coordination that make it insolvable without a significant
governmental role.112 Countries that have made significant progress on the
climate issue take a more pragmatic and less ideological view of the
appropriate role of government than we do. So, progress on the climate issue
is linked to making progress on broader issues of the appropriate role of
government.
This requires environmental advocates and their political allies in
Congress to figure out how to advance a broader project of sensible
governance. They should, for example, repeatedly remind the American
people of the role deregulation played in creating the financial crisis. 113
Reasonable standards of conduct are as important to well-functioning
markets as they are to our efforts to solve environmental problems.
Furthermore, politicians who do not want to see the government dismantled
need to simply say, repeatedly, that they support an adequate government.
This would start a healthy debate about what constitutes an adequate
government and marginalize those who oppose an adequate government. At
any rate, progress in phasing out fossil fuels will require political changes
and strategic actions to make them come about.114
I do not think it is possible for anybody to prove a view about what
political strategy is best. I provide my views merely to clarify the questions
that a phase-out goal raises. These questions include whether we can sell a
phase-out without arguing against continued fossil fuel use directly, and how
we can move the political process to accept a legitimate role for government
more generally. An effort to change the political climate to make a phaseout politically plausible requires answers to these questions.

112.
113.
114.
supra note 107.
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CONCLUSION

Addressing climate disruption requires a phase-out of fossil fuels.
Accepting this proposition reframes the questions we should ask ourselves
about how to design effective environmental policy and how to create a
political climate where we can adopt sensible policies.
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